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Abstract 
The roles of the courts have become an inevitable social reality 
in adjudicating customary law disputes in Nigeria and South 
Africa. Because these courts are established and validated 
along positivist practice, they inevitably require the adoption of 
a process for ascertaining and applying customary law since 
the judges of these courts are not ordinarily conversant with its 
norms. Hence judicial notice has been adopted as one of the 
ways of ascertaining customary law. The conceptualisation and 
theoretical basis of customary law cannot be ignored in the 
analysis of the process of its ascertainment. Crucial to this are 
theories of centralism, legal pluralism and positivism. This 
paper therefore identifies challenges in ascertaining customary 
law through judicial notice in the various cadres of courts 
operative in both jurisdictions amid the operation of these 
theories and the attendant implications thereof. It elucidates the 
rules that guide the judge and identifies the challenges 
encountered in each jurisdiction based on how each law is 
scripted. It also contends that while positivist rules and 
procedure regulate how customary law can be ascertained and 
applied by the courts, its application must however be limited 
to the point where it threatens the essence of customary law. 
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1 Introduction 
The role of the courts has become an inevitable social reality in Nigeria and 
South Africa. Being formally bestowed with adjudicatory functions 
necessary for societal equilibrium, they have had increasing impact in 
stabilising the polity by adjudicating over disputes based on the applicable 
laws of the land, which include customary law. 
The adjudication of customary law in these jurisdictions has long shifted 
from the exclusive preserve of indigenous courts to include non-customary 
courts. Therefore the function of regular courts in ascertaining and applying 
living customary law in both countries cannot be downplayed even though 
established and validated along positivist practice. This inevitably requires 
the adoption of a process for ascertaining and applying customary law by 
the judges of these courts since they are not ordinarily conversant with its 
norms. Even though the court cannot go to the field to ascertain these norms 
and rules, it will not be entirely correct to state that it does not engage in 
ascertainment. Granted that it does not utilise sociological or 
anthropological methods when embarking on this exercise, it however 
ascertains from the flurry of evidence presented to it what the applicable 
customary law is or the closest to it within its limitations.1 To do this properly, 
the court requires some knowledge and skills necessary for adjudication at 
this level - skills in logic and analysis, and evidential prowess. In other 
words, the court requires knowledge and skills in the process of judging and 
other factors that influence the process. 
                                            
*  Rebecca Emiene Badejogbin. LLB (Jos) LLM (Jos) LLM (Research) (Pretoria) PhD 
(Cape Town). Director (Academics) Nigerian Law School, Abuja, Nigeria. Email: 
badejogbin_re@yahoo.com. This research was done under the NRF Chair in 
Customary Law, Indigenous Values and Human Rights, Private Law Department, 
University of Cape Town as part of the author's doctoral research. It was partly 
funded by the South African Research Chairs Initiative of the Department of Science 
and Technology and National Research Foundation of South Africa (Grant No 
64825). The opinions, findings and conclusion, and recommendations expressed in 
this paper are those of the author and the National Research Foundation does not 
accept any liability in this respect. It was presented at the Conference on the 
Recording of Customary Law in South Africa, Canada and the New Caledonia which 
was held on 2–3 May 2018 at the Faculty of Law, University of Cape Town, Cape 
Town, South Africa, and at the International Conference on the Commission for 
Legal Pluralism which was held on 22–24 August 2018 at the University of Ottawa, 
Ottawa, Canada. I express my gratitude for the insightful comments I received. I 
acknowledge Prof Chuma Himonga for her invaluable guidance and input, and also, 
Dr Oluwatoyin Badejogbin and Dr Fatimata Diallo.  
1  In some instances, anthropological methods are presented to the court as in the 
case of Pilane v Pilane 2013 4 BCLR 431 (CC). 
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The adoption and application of this process have not been without 
challenges. Generally, the court adopts two approaches which are judicial 
notice and presentation of evidence through facts in ascertaining and 
applying customary law. This paper therefore identifies challenges in 
ascertaining customary law through judicial notice in the various cadres of 
courts operative in both jurisdictions amid the operation of positivism and 
legal pluralism. It elucidates the rules that guide the judge and identifies the 
challenges encountered in each jurisdiction based on how each law is 
scripted. While the challenges are discussed separately under the two 
jurisdictions, they equally apply in both where the laws are similarly scripted. 
Judicial notice is: 
… [a] court's acceptance, for purposes of convenience and without requiring 
a party's proof, of a well-known and indisputable fact.2 
It pertains to the court's power to accept such a fact as law.3 Even though 
judicial notice was seldom used by Nigerian and South African courts in the 
cases analysed in this research,4 it is still relevant because statutorily, it 
remains one of the main ways of ascertaining customary law and where it 
is developed, it enhances the process. The dearth in utilising this method of 
proof is mainly because official versions of customary laws that capture the 
many nuanced differences between normative customary practices in a 
community, clan or even family are not exhaustive. Where used, it was done 
in relation to broad and common principles, such as male primogeniture. 
This was mostly in relation to official customary law assumed to be at par 
with the current normative practice of the communities in the dispute and 
developed without any reference to what the living norm might be. 
                                            
2  Black and Nolan Black's Law Dictionary. 
3  See para 2 above. 
4  The cases analysed include: Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community 2004 5 SA 460 
(CC); Anekwe v Nweke (2014) LPELR-22697 (SC); Aragbui of Iragbui-Oba Olabomi 
v Olabode Oyewinle SC Suit No SC345/2012; Bapedi Marota Mamone v The 
Commission of Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims 2014 ZASCA 30 (28 
March 2014); Bhe v Khayelitsha Magistrate 2005 1 SA 580 (CC); Danjuma Achor v 
Mahionu Aduku CAA Appeal No CA/A/67/05; Gumede (born Shange) v President of 
the Republic of South Africa 2009 3 SA 152 (CC); Maphuye Onkemetse Sophy v 
Balebetse Maphunye (Bahurutshe Magistrate Court, Lehurutshe) (unreported) case 
number 06/2013; Nwaigwe v Okere (unreported) case number SC/392/2002; 
Obusez v Obusez (2007) 2 All NLR 458; Ojiogu v Ojiogu (2010) SC 235/2004; Shaba 
Ndadile v Etsu Nupe case number CA/A/178/07; Temile v Awani (Supreme Court) 
SC/79/96; Ukeje v Ukeje case number SC/224/04; Uwaifo v Uwaifo (2013) LPELR-
20389 (SC). 
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2 Musings of customary law conceptualisation 
The conceptualisation and theoretical basis of customary law cannot be 
ignored in the analysis of the process of its ascertainment. Crucial to this 
are theories of centralism, legal pluralism and positivism. 
Centralism describes legal systems that recognise only laws that are made 
by the state which are "uniform", "exclusive" and administered by only state 
institutions.5 Such a statist approach denies the existence of other systems 
of law such as customary law, except to the extent that they have been 
enacted into law. The recognition of living customary law not enacted into 
law in Nigeria and South Africa adheres to centralist precepts because this 
recognition is made by constitutional provisions interpreted by the Court.6 
However, the existence of customary law as well as other state and non-
state legal systems in both countries is evidence of the operation of a 
pluralist system and this paper therefore adopts Griffith's position that legal 
centralism is a myth.7 
Legal positivism highlights the "conventional" character of law8 as a social 
conception that is founded on norms that have been put forward in court 
decisions, legislation and even through practice.9 According to positivists, 
the legitimacy or authority of law derives from its source the ability to 
execute it and its efficacy.10 
The concept of living customary law is enshrined as state law in South Africa 
through the constitutional provision that affirms it as "an original source of 
law at par" with other sources of law.11 In Mabena v Letsoalo,12 the high 
court of South Africa affirmed the concept when it held per Du Plessis J that 
"living law [denotes] law actually observed by African communities"13 and 
that this, rather than official statements (or versions) of customary law is 
                                            
5  See para 2 above. 
6  Sections 39(3) and 211 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
See also Mabena v Letsoalo 1998 2 SA 1068 (T) and Lewis v Bankole (1909) INLR 
81. 
7  Griffiths 1986 J Legal Plur 4, 38-39. 
8  Himma Date Unknown https://www.iep.utm.edu/legalpos/. Jeremy Bentham, John 
Austin and Hart were positivist. See Sweet Date Unknown 
https://www.iep.utm.edu/bentham; Lacey Life of HLA Hart; and Lacey 2004 Melb J 
Int'l L Item 1.A. 
9  Himma Date Unknown https://www.iep.utm.edu/legalpos/. 
10  Himma Date Unknown https://www.iep.utm.edu/legalpos/. 
11  Shilubana v Nwamitwa 2009 2 SA 66 (CC) para 54. See Himonga "Future of Living 
Customary Law" 41. See also Badejogbin 2014/2015 SADCLJ 14. 
12  Mabena v Letsoalo 1998 2 SA 1068 (T). 
13  Appears to be the first South African case in which the concept was used. 
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what courts have an obligation to ascertain and enforce in disputes involving 
customary law. 
The same concept of living customary law has also been affirmed in Nigeria 
since 1908. In the Nigerian case of Lewis v Bankole14 where the court held 
that customary law "must be existing native law or custom and not the native 
law or custom of ancient times…".15 In Kharie Zaidan v Fatima Mohsen16 
also, the Supreme Court defined customary law as "any system of law [that 
is neither common law nor statutory law], but which is enforceable and 
binding within Nigeria as between the parties subject to its sway". In 
Oyewunmi v Ogunesan,17 the Supreme Court had this to say about 
customary law: 
Customary law is the organic or living law of the indigenous people of Nigeria 
regulating their lives and transactions. It is organic in that it is not static, is 
regulatory in that it controls the lives and transactions of the community 
subject to it. 
It is this organic version of customary law that ought to be ascertained and 
applied. 
In a pluralistic state, whether weak or strong, customary law as a normative 
system exists as law.18 Moore, a pluralist, explained that the conception of 
law now includes the participation of institutions and organisations in the 
"context of legal obligations".19 The legal systems of both countries operate 
along the line of positivism and illustrations of their underlying positivist 
leaning can be found in the jurisdiction of their state courts to apply state 
laws. The analysis of the process of ascertaining and applying customary 
law is conducted on state institutions established and validated along 
positivist practice. Thus, while in its essential nature living customary law 
                                            
14  Lewis v Bankole (1909) INLR 81 100. 
15  Lewis v Bankole (1909) INLR 81 81. Emphasis added. The fundamental rights/bill of 
rights contained in the Constitutions of both countries should be used as the standard 
for the application of customary law rather than the repugnancy test doctrine which 
is said to have outlived its usefulness. This is especially for South Africa where 
customary law has been acknowledged as a distinct source of law. 
16  Kharie Zaidan v Fatima Mohsen (1971) UILR (Pt II) 283 292. 
17  Oyewunmi v Ogunesan (1990) 3 NWLR (Pt 137) 182 207E–F.  
18  Weak legal pluralism is a situation where different legal norms operative within a 
state are recognised and regulated by state institutions while strong legal pluralism 
is explained as a situation where both state and non-state legal norms co-exist within 
the boundaries of the state and are respectively regulated by both state and non-
state institutions. South African state law recognises customary law as well as 
common law and the Roman-Dutch law while it does not acknowledge religious 
norms. Nigeria recognises customary law as well as common law and Islamic norms 
in certain parts but fails to recognise other religious norms. See Sezgin 2004 J Legal 
Plur 102. See also Rautenbach 2010 J Legal Plur 145–146. 
19  Moore Law as Process 218; Malinowski Crime and Custom; Bohannan 2009 Am 
Anthropol 34, 35; and Moore 1969 BRA 259 
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may not be regarded as state law or positivist law, its formal recognition by 
state courts and other state institutions creates official versions that may be 
regarded as part of state-made (positivist) law.20 Customary law is state law 
only when it is formally acknowledged as such. In the real sense, however, 
it is not positivist law but encompasses social realities and practices that 
form the basis of its existence as norms operative in communities that are 
referred to as living customary law. Yet, by its very nature and operation, 
customary law cannot be described as positivist or contained within the 
structures of positivist law. This paper aligns its view in part with Van 
Niekerk21 that living customary law in the absence of state 
acknowledgement is law in its own right; but it also agrees with Himonga et 
al that it is state law and may also be termed as positivist law due to its 
formal acknowledgement by the State.22 
Both Nigeria and South Africa are pluralist states and have within their legal 
systems plural sources of law that incorporate customary law, the imported 
common law and other sources of law (including Roman-Dutch law for 
South Africa). Customary law is, however, recognised differently in both 
countries. While in South Africa it is at par with other sources of law but 
subject to the Constitution and legislation, in Nigeria, it is subservient to 
other sources of law but yet, judicial notice is one of the two ways it is 
ascertained and applied by the courts in both countries and this is not 
without challenges. Another thing they share in common is the fact that they 
each have to contend with the challenge of the convergence of positivism 
and legal pluralism in this process of ascertainment and application. Despite 
the divergence of positivism and pluralism in ideology and jurisprudence, a 
path must yet be paved to enhance their interaction as they regulate this 
process. One of such paths is where a statutory law in its provisions, 
provides for the application of the applicable customary law without 
specifically stating the rules and norms. This gives room for the applicable 
living customary law to be ascertained outside the bounds and limitations of 
the statute.23 Another path relates to statutes providing for the procedure to 
be adopted in a proceeding while the applicable substantive law is the 
applicable customary law.24 
                                            
20  According to Bennett, official versions suffer the problem of presuming the contents 
of customary law. See Bennett Sourcebook of African Customary Law 2. 
21  Van Niekerk 2012 SUBB Jurisprudentia 5. 
22  Himonga et al African Customary Law 46. 
23  Examples of such legislations are the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 
of 1998 and the various Wills Laws applicable in most of the States in Nigeria, such 
as the Wills Law Bendel State 172, Laws of Bendel State, 1976, Wills Law Kaduna 
State 163, Laws of Kaduna State, 1991, and the Wills Law Lagos State W2, Laws of 
Lagos State, 2004. 
24  Examples of such are the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988 in South 
Africa and the Evidence Act, 2011 in Nigeria. 
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Notwithstanding the different status of customary law in both countries, the 
challenges faced with respect to ascertaining and applying customary law 
through judicial notice are similar and present an intriguing interface 
between positivist rules of evidence and procedure, and, the essence of 
legal pluralism where the application of positivist rules compels customary 
law to be defined by it, and, the rejection of this definition by the latter. This 
paper contends that a middle ground can be paved to accommodate both 
ideologies albeit to a limit. While positivist rules and procedure regulate how 
customary law can be ascertained and applied by the courts, its application 
must however be limited to the point where it threatens the essence of 
customary law. 
How customary law is ascertained and applied in courts today is influenced 
by how the courts operated under colonial rule because it laid the foundation 
for current practice. This influence is in the area of the conceptualisation of 
customary law fostered by the nature and structure of the courts with 
jurisdiction to hear customary law matters. It also includes the judges' 
knowledge in customary law and the policy of the colonial government which 
did not favour a sincere development of the rules of customary law. It is 
important to note, however, that despite these challenges, in certain 
instances, there were extensive engagements with customary norms and 
its concepts including its ascertainment and application which produced 
certain notable decisions on customary law such as the case of Lewis v 
Bankole.25 
3 Courts with jurisdiction to hear customary court cases 
South Africa has a dual system of courts comprising courts of chiefs and 
headmen as customary courts and other courts made up of courts of 
specialised and general jurisdiction.26 The status of the courts of chiefs and 
headmen (referred to in this paper as traditional courts) as forming part of 
the categories of courts in the Constitution was affirmed by the 
Constitutional Court in the case of Re: certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996.27 
                                            
25  Lewis v Bankole (1908) INLR 81. 
26  Berat 1991 Fordham Int'l LJ 94. Berat expressed in her discussion on the 
transformation process of South Africa after the collapse of apartheid that customary 
law being the basis of the dual system of law and courts in South Africa will not be 
overlooked.  
27  Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 1996 4 SA 744 
(CC). This case was instituted to affirm whether the proposals in the then proposed 
1996 Constitution were in line with the constitutional policies. 
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The courts of general jurisdiction entertain matters of customary law. The 
South African courts that have jurisdiction to hear customary law cases 
include the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal, the high 
court, regional court, magistrate's courts, as well as other courts established 
or recognised by an Act of Parliament. These other courts may be similar in 
status to the high court or magistrate's courts. The Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act (South Africa) provides that any court may take judicial 
notice of customary law and this includes courts that fall under the last 
category mentioned here.28 
Nigeria on the other hand operates forms of dual and multiple court 
systems. At both the federal and state levels, it has customary/area courts 
and courts of general jurisdiction also empowered to hear cases on 
customary law. Courts with jurisdiction to hear customary law cases are 
creations of statutes and the Constitution and are categorised into courts of 
superior and inferior jurisdictions. These courts include the Supreme Court 
of Nigeria, the Court of Appeal, the high courts of the States and the Federal 
Capital Territory (FCT), the customary courts of appeal of the states and the 
FCT and customary/area courts.29 It is however important to note that 
customary/area courts in Nigeria differ in essence from the traditional courts 
in South Africa. While the former are not traditional courts set up within the 
communities (with their higher cadres being manned mainly by legal 
practitioners), the later are traditional courts within the indigenous 
communities manned by traditional leaders. 
4 The process of ascertainment 
The Black's Law Dictionary broadly defines "judicial process" as including 
"all the acts of a court from the beginning to the end of its proceedings in a 
given cause".30 The ascertainment of customary law forms part of the 
judicial process. The process of ascertainment of a legal system entails "the 
determination of the conditions in which its rules can be identified and 
applied in legal proceedings".31 Ascertaining customary law engages 
processes that contribute to how the court determines and applies 
                                            
28  Koyana, Bekker and Mqeke "Traditional Authority Courts" 174. The authors claim 
that the small claims court in South Africa falls under this category and can receive 
evidence of customary law in land disputes.Other specialised courts with jurisdiction 
in customary law such as the Land Claims court are not included here because this 
paper is restricted to the regular courts. 
29  Section 6(5) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. Also 
inclusive are "[S]uch other courts as may be authorised by law to exercise jurisdiction 
on matters with respect to which the National Assembly may make laws; and such 
other court as may be authorised by law to exercise jurisdiction at first instance or 
on appeal on matters with respect to which a House of Assembly may make laws." 
30  Black and Nolan Black's Law Dictionary. 
31  Himonga et al African Customary Law 58. 
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customary law. Here, the power of the judge to exercise discretion is vital 
and is derived from the rules of evidence, court procedure rules and laws, 
and the inherent powers of the courts. 
In Nigeria and South Africa, ascertaining customary law by formal courts is 
regulated by statute and the processes are broadly similar. Every court type 
in these countries with jurisdiction to hear cases of customary law adopts a 
process of ascertainment. For customary courts manned by chiefs of the 
particular locality, the process may be more limited. For instance, where the 
customary law to be applied is that of the particular community, the 
traditional leader may not need any external aid in ascertainment and 
application. Relying on his/her knowledge is a process. So also is conferring 
with his/her council of elders on what may be areas of uncertainty with 
respect to ascertaining the content of the law to be applied to the sets of 
facts before the court. 
4.1 Nigeria 
While in Nigeria, the process of ascertaining customary law is regulated by 
the Evidence Act, procedural rules of courts and the respective laws of 
particular courts,32 the former33 is the main legislation that regulates the 
judicial ascertainment and application of customary law. It, however, 
excludes the customary courts of appeal, and customary and area courts in 
its application. This exclusion is, however, subject to an order by a 
constitutionally instituted authority allowing the application of all or certain 
provisions of the Evidence Act.34 In accordance with this provision, the 
Federal Capital Territory Customary Court Act,35 for instance, empowers 
                                            
32  The Evidence Act, 2011 is within the purview of the exclusive legislative list of the 
National Assembly and therefore it applies to courts within the country. Other laws 
and procedural rules are enacted by the respective state legislature. For the FCT, 
however, its procedural rules and laws are enacted by the National Assembly. 
Others include Court of Appeal Rules, 2016; Court of Appeal Act, 2016; Customary 
Court (Appeal) Rules, Federal Capital Territory of Abuja, 1996; Customary Court 
(Civil Procedure) Rules, Federal Capital Territory of Abuja, 2007; Supreme Court 
(Civil Procedure) Rules, 2005.  
33  Evidence Act, 2011. This Act replaced the Evidence Act, 2004 (Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria, Cap E14). 
34  Section 256(1)(c) of the Evidence Act, 2011 provides that: "This Act shall apply to all 
judicial proceedings in or before any court established in the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria but it shall not apply … to judicial proceedings in any civil cause or matter in 
or before any … Customary Court of Appeal, Area Court or Customary Court unless 
any authority empowered to do so under the Constitution, by order published in the 
Gazette, confers upon any or all … Customary Courts of Appeal, Area Courts or 
Customary Courts in the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja or a State, as the case may 
be, power to enforce any or all the provisions of this Act". 
35  Federal Capital Territory Abuja Customary Court Act 8 of 2007. See s 65 which 
provides that "The Customary Court and Customary Court of Appeal FCT Abuja shall 
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both the customary court of appeal and the customary courts within the 
territory to apply certain provisions of the Evidence Act, including provisions 
that pertain to the ascertainment of customary law. 
The Evidence Act provides for two ways of proving customary law in court. 
According to section 16(1): 
 … [a] custom may be adopted as part of the law governing a particular set of 
admissible circumstances if it can be judicially noticed or can be proved to 
exist by evidence. 
Subsection (2) of the provision lays the burden of proving a custom on the 
person who alleges that the custom exists.36 
Clearly, the probable convergence of statutory law and customary law in the 
judicial resolution of disputes comes to the fore in section 16(1), as the 
provision authorises the court to also consider customary law among other 
sources of applicable law. But just as pertinent is the statutory recognition 
that customary law may apply in resolving a judicial matter if its existence 
can be proved according to the rules of evidence. It is, as it were, a 
convergence of positivist law and customary law. Stating that customary law 
may apply "as part of the law" means that customary law will apply as the 
substantive law.37 However, statutory and common law will regulate the 
procedure, which includes the processes by which customary law will be 
ascertained. 
There is a jurisprudential difference between the two methods of 
ascertainment. Until it is proved (ascertained), the court regards customary 
law38 as fact rather than as law. It is therefore implied that it becomes law 
when its existence has been established through evidence and applied by 
the court in its judgment. However, when customary law can be judicially 
noticed, it is viewed by the court as the law on the subject. The customary 
law proved through evidence is viewed as law only after it is ascertained 
and applied by the court in its judgment.39 This, as the legal pluralist may 
say, is a consequence of centralist views of legal theory. But what, precisely, 
                                            
in Judicial Proceedings be bound by the provisions of ss 14, 15, 59, 76, 77 ,78, 92, 
93, 135, 136, 155, 177 and 227 of the Evidence Act". 
36  In Orlu v Gogo-Abite (2010) 8 NWLR (Pt 1196) 307 the Supreme Court held that 
Ikwere native law and custom of inheritance which was the basis of the plaintiff's 
claim of ownership was not proved in the case and judicial notice of it could not be 
taken because it had not been notoriously decided. There could well be situations 
where a court takes judicial notice of some parts of the customary law while requiring 
proof (facts) on other parts. 
37' Substantive as used here is the sense of substantive as opposed to procedural. 
38  Except official versions. 
39  Obilade Nigerian Legal System 97. 
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is judicial notice and when may a court apply it as precedent on a question 
of customary law? 
The doctrine of judicial precedent is integral in the concept of judicial notice. 
According to the doctrine, the judgment of a superior court can be judicially 
noticed.40 
The basis for judicial notice of customary law was laid out in section 14 of 
the old Evidence Act, which provided as follows: 
A custom may be judicially noticed by the court if it has been acted upon by a 
court of superior or co-ordinate jurisdiction in the same area to an extent which 
justifies the court asked to apply it in assuming that the persons or the class 
of persons concerned in that area look upon the same as binding in relation 
to circumstances similar to those under consideration. 
Section 17 of the current Evidence Act preserves the doctrine. But it simply 
states that, "A custom may be judicially noticed when it has been 
adjudicated upon once by a superior court of record".41 As the provision 
before it, this provision allows courts to exercise judicial discretion in the 
matter of taking judicial notice about the existence of a custom. However, 
the provision seems to establish a single requirement for a custom to be 
judicially noticed. All it requires is that a superior court has adjudicated on 
the custom before, and once.42 It would seem this provision dispenses with 
the old requirements that the custom of which judicial notice is sought to be 
taken, must have been adjudicated upon to an extent that the court could 
justify its bindingness in similar circumstances and in the same community. 
This would seem to suggest lessening of the standard for establishing 
precedent on an issue of customary law or for justifying judicial notice 
thereof. 
It is important to see how this new provision could constitute a problem. The 
repealed law gave courts the liberty to determine the extent to which a 
custom may be justifiably noticed judicially, guided by the stipulation that 
the custom must have been considered to an extent that justifies the court 
to presume it is settled law on the matter. The Privy Council's position on 
this law in the case of Angu v Attah43 was that for a custom to be judicially 
noticed, it must have been repeatedly proven in a court of law. This 
Ghanaian case decided by the Privy Council in 1916 formed the basis upon 
                                            
40  Sections 5(1)(a)-(l) and 6(3) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
1999 list the superior courts of records to include the high courts and other courts of 
coordinate jurisdiction in an ascending manner to the Court of Appeal and the 
Supreme Court. 
41  Section 17 of the Evidence Act, 2011. 
42  This position is also shared by Adangor 2015 JLPG 38-39. 
43  Angu v Attah [1916] PC Gold Coast 1874-1928 43. 
RE BADEJOGBIN PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  12 
which customary law was proved in Anglophone Africa including Nigeria and 
South Africa.44 The decision offers a reliable standard as it affirms the 
agency of a frequentative process that allows scrutiny, evaluation and sifting 
until the actual binding rule of custom is determined and errors are 
eliminated. 
This position was adopted in several Nigerian cases.45 In Olagbemiro v 
Ajagungbade,46 the high court and the Court of Appeal made a number of 
decisions supporting the appellant/plaintiff's claim on ownership of land in 
Ogbomoso. There was another case on the same subject in which the 
Supreme Court seemingly deferred from the decisions at both the high court 
and the Court of Appeal. The judge at the high court considered the 
evidence led during trial independently from earlier judgments at the high 
court, Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court and differed from the position 
of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court on appeal confirmed the 
decision of the high court which took judicial notice of the decisions of the 
earlier high court and Court of Appeal and elaborated that the position 
expressed in its judgment (at the Supreme Court) was obiter dictum of which 
a judicial notice could not be taken and the ratio decidendi was on a different 
subject and did not apply to the case. It should however be noted that these 
cases were adjudicated during the pendency of the Evidence Act which 
required proof to an extent. These jurisprudential developments of the 
standard/guideline for adopting judicial notice in ascertaining customary law 
though achieved under the repealed Evidence Act may still be adopted for 
the new law despite the dearth of its provisions to require such. 
There are of course cases where frequent application of a custom does not 
necessarily confirm its authenticity. In such cases, it may not be justified to 
take judicial notice of the custom.47 However, where a court is satisfied that 
the process employed by another court to ascertain the authenticity and 
accuracy of a custom now being contested before it was painstaking and 
left no stone unturned, the mere fact that the custom had been judicially 
deliberated upon only once should not prevent the court from taking judicial 
notice of it. 
                                            
44  Bennett Application of Customary Law 19. 
45  See Giwa v Erinmilokun (1961) 1 All NLR 294 and Olabanji v Omokewu (1992) 
NWLR (Pt 250) 671. See also Romaine v Romaine (1992) 4 NWLR (Pt 238) 650 
where the Supreme Court cautioned the Court on its duty to make further enquiries 
with respect to the authenticity of the land title of a party to its satisfaction irrespective 
of the fact that the party may have presented a title document. 
46  Olagbemiro v Ajagungbade III (1990) NWLR (Pt 136) 37. 
47  Obilade Nigerian Legal System 97. 
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Thus, in Cole v Akinjele,48 decided prior to the enactment of the current 
Evidence Act, the court was called upon to take judicial notice of a Yoruba 
customary law that entitled children born outside wedlock to inherit 
alongside children born within wedlock. This was on the premise that the 
father acknowledged paternity while alive. The custom had only been 
proved in one case ‒ Alake v Pratt.49 The court (in Cole) found that the 
custom had been satisfactorily proved based on the weight of evidence put 
before the court in Alake v Pratt and took judicial notice of the custom. 
The provision of the current Evidence Act requiring that once a custom has 
been adjudicated upon once by a superior court, it "may be judicially 
noticed", does not require that it must also justify its application by the judge 
in the particular case. While it is reasonably expected that a judge would 
consider that before judicially taking notice of a custom, omitting that in the 
provision of the statute is amiss. It should be noted that the provision 
preserves for the courts a considerable berth of discretion on the matter 
which may be erroneously exercised. 
Under the previous Evidence Act, a court may take judicial notice of a 
custom from a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction as well as from a court of 
superior jurisdiction, meaning that judicial notice can be taken of a judgment 
of a customary court by another customary court. The current Evidence Act 
limits judicial notice to be taken from only superior courts of record. The 
implication of this is that the wealth of customary norms ascertained and 
applied by customary courts may not be utilised through judicial notice even 
though some of these customary courts outside are manned by traditional 
leaders who are versed in the customary norms and their decisions may be 
devoid of Eurocentrism and tend more towards living customary law. 
A court is not necessarily bound to take judicial notice of a customary norm 
that has been established in a prior judicial process – even if the process 
was before a court of superior jurisdiction where credible evidence led 
before the later court with respect to the same circumstances contradicts 
the finding of the earlier court. The operative word "may" in section 17 of the 
new Act gives the later court the discretion to refrain from taking judicial 
notice of a customary law even if that law was ascertained by a court with 
superior jurisdiction. The credible contradictory evidence of the applicable 
customary law should constitute a justifiable reason to not take judicial 
notice of a customary law that has been determined by a superior court. 
                                            
48  Cole v Akinjele (1960) 5 FSC 84. See also Olagbemiro v Ajagungbade III (1990) 
NWLR (Pt 136) 37. 
49  Alake v Pratt (1955) 15 WACA 20. 
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Ordinarily, the principle of judicial precedent compels compliance with the 
decision of a superior court of record.50 However, "judicially noticed facts 
may be rebuttable".51 This would happen where a court with superior 
jurisdiction erred when ascertaining a customary rule. For example, a court 
may not judicially notice a customary rule if the facts or issues in the case 
in which it was previously ascertained are distinguishable from the case at 
hand. Arguably, where the judicially noticed customary law is made without 
due regard to actual normative practice and the facts of the particular case, 
a court should be at liberty to refrain from accepting such in view of fresh 
credible evidence to the contrary. 
When a court fails to appropriately ascertain customary law, it violates the 
constitutional rights of the people whose rights it is to have their lives 
regulated by the customary law in question and to have their disputes 
resolved according to that custom. It is therefore particularly crucial for 
courts to ascertain customary law properly as their decisions invariably 
become precedents or can be judicially noticed. 
By requiring that "[a] custom may be judicially noticed when it has been 
adjudicated upon once by a superior court of record", section 17 dispenses 
with the need for parties to prove the facts constituting the customary norm 
in question. Indeed, according to section 122(1) "[n]o fact of which the court 
shall take judicial notice under this section needs to be proven". However, 
sub-section 122(2)(l) of the provision seems to introduce ambiguity over 
what a court shall do with a custom that has been judicially ascertained. The 
section provides as follows: 
The court shall take judicial notice of … all general customs, rules and 
principles which have been held to have the force of law in any court 
established by or under the Constitution and all customs which have been duly 
certified to and recorded in any such court. 
                                            
50  This position was recently reinforced by the Supreme Court in Chukwuma Ogwe v 
Inspector General of Police (2015) LPELR-24322 (SC) 2, 4. However, a court would 
not follow a precedent where the facts are not similar, or the same point is not in 
controversy. A court may also overrule its previous decision where that decision was 
made per incurium, where justice will not be achieved, or where constitutionally 
bestowed rights will be inhibited, and where it will not enhance appropriate 
development of the law. See Johnson v Lawanson (1971) 1 NMLR 380. In this case, 
the Supreme Court departed from the "error" committed in the decision of the Privy 
Council in Maurice Goulin v Aminu (1957) PC Appeal 17 of 1957 but sustained that 
of Awosanya v Anifowoshe (1959) 4 FSC 94. See Ngwo v Monye (1970) 1 All NLR 
91; Aqua Ltd v Ondo State Sport Council (1988) NWLR (Pt 91) 622; Mobil Oil v Coker 
(1975) ECSLR 175; Orubu v NEC (1988) 5 NWLR (Pt 94) 323. See Asein 
Introduction to Nigerian Legal System 78, 83. 
51  Zeffert et al South African Law of Evidence 717. 
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According to subsections (3) and (4) of the provision,52 a court may resort 
to books, documents or references as aids for the purpose of taking judicial 
notice and may decline to do so until the party alleging the fact (custom) 
produces such books or document. 
Apparently, subsections (3) and (4) recognise the fact that courts may rely 
on documentary proof in addition to the judicial precedent itself for the 
purpose of taking judicial notice. It is another layer of evidence intended to 
ensure that the decision to take judicial notice is rightfully made. Scholarly 
or other works that document facts or authoritative statements about 
customary law, especially where those facts have been judicially 
ascertained and subjected to further anthropological studies, provide more 
certainty about the authenticity of the alleged custom. 
However, as noted above, section 122 is not without problems, especially 
for living customary law. Subsection (2) employs mandatory language: 
[T]he court shall take judicial notice of … all general customs … held to have 
the force of law in any court. 
The language may appear to take away the discretionary dimension of 
taking judicial notice as provided for in section 17. The best probable way 
to reconcile the apparent contradiction between these provisions is to 
consider section 122 as only requiring that courts take notice of judicial 
pronouncements on customary law and to apply them only when they have 
ascertained that those pronouncements remain the law on the subject 
matter. In other words, in so far as sections 17 and 122 go, and as is 
typically expected of courts when considering precedent, a court in a 
customary law matter must not only acknowledge precedent, it must 
determine whether it remains law and is applicable in the instant case – 
hence, the provision that courts also consult books, documents and 
references. 
It is this interpretation that preserves the discretion of the court, as, 
according to section 17, it may take judicial notice but it is not bound to do 
so. Courts ordinarily ought to take any judicially noticed fact or custom as 
the settled "law" on the issue but it may be suggested that the Evidence Act 
takes a unique approach to judicial notice. By inference, subsections (3) and 
(4) of section 122 bequeath the court with the leeway to consider facts that 
may suggest that the custom has evolved from what was ascertained in a 
previous case only if they have books or documents to support this. This, it 
is argued, will greatly hinder the ascertainment of living customary law and 
has the potential of promoting official customary law because the living norm 
                                            
52  Section 122 of the Evidence Act, 2011. 
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may not have been captured in writing and official versions are often 
contained in written form. Therefore, where parties have reason to dispute 
the content of a customary law that has been judicially noticed, they should 
be given the chance to present evidence to the contrary. 
The provision of section 1(2) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act in 
South Africa already addresses this by stating that "the provisions of 
subsection (1) shall not preclude any party from adducing evidence of the 
substance of a legal rule contemplated in that subsection which is in issue 
at the proceedings concerned". A similar provision to this in Nigeria is 
section 16(1) of the Evidence Act which provides that, "A custom may be 
adopted as part of the law governing a particular set of admissible 
circumstances if it can be judicially noticed or can be proved to exist by 
evidence".53 The concern is the use of the disjunctive word "or" denoting 
mutual exclusivity. This positivist centralist position constrains the 
application of living customary law. 
4.2 South Africa 
The main legislation regulating ascertaining and applying customary law by 
courts in South Africa is also the Law of Evidence Amendment Act.54 This 
Act does not restrict its application to specific courts but provides that it 
applies to any court which by implication could include the traditional courts. 
This is different from the situation in Nigeria. The Act also provides two ways 
in which customary law can be ascertained by the courts. As in Nigeria, they 
are by judicial notice and by adducing evidence. 
By virtue of section 1(1) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act,  
Any court may take judicial notice of the law of a foreign state and of 
indigenous law in so far as such law can be ascertained readily and with 
sufficient certainty … . 
This provision gives the courts discretion with respect to how judicial notice 
should be applied because it does not state the detailed circumstances of 
how it must be done.55 Bekker and van der Merwe state that the provision 
of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act did give the court the discretion to 
                                            
53  Emphasis added. 
54  Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988. Other relevant rules include Rules of 
the Constitutional Court, 2003 (GN R1675 in GG 25726 of 31 October 2003) and 
Rules of the Supreme Court of Appeal, 1998 (GN R1523 in GG 19507 of 17 
November 1998). 
55  Bekker and Van der Merwe 2011 SAPL 116-117. 
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apply judicial notice in ascertaining customary law and this has been done 
based on the "whims and fancies of the whole spectrum of justices".56 
There are divergent positions regarding whether the Act compels courts to 
take judicial notice of indigenous laws in its process of ascertainment and 
application with respect to the choice of law rules that relate to the 
application of customary law and common law. In Thibela v Minister van 
Wet en Orde,57 the Supreme Court of Appeal held that section 1(1) gave 
courts no discretion in applying customary law where necessary and is 
mandatorily required to do so when it is applicable with respect to the choice 
of law rules between applying either customary law or common law. 
Academics like Kerr58 and Bennett59 have argued that section 1(1) makes 
the utilisation of judicial notice mandatory while the application of customary 
law is not mandatorily required.60 In other words, while the court may not be 
compelled to apply customary law, it was mandated to adopt judicially 
noticed norms of customary law where they are available when applying 
customary law. 
According to Himonga et al,61 neither the application of customary law nor 
the utilisation of judicial notice is mandated, as the wording of the provision 
clearly gives room for the exercise of discretion on the application of 
customary law and the adoption of judicial notice. However, the court must 
apply customary law "where it is applicable".62 
The Constitution provides in section 211(3) that "courts must apply 
customary law when that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution and 
any legislation that specifically deals with customary law". This section has 
been explained in the scope of choice of law rules.63 That is, where it is 
determined that customary law is applicable and not statutory or common 
law, then it must be applied to the case.64 Bennett explains that the choice 
of law rules extends to making a choice "between different systems of 
customary laws". Therefore, based on section 1(1) of the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act, the courts may utilise judicial notice as an aid to ascertain 
                                            
56  Bekker and Van der Merwe 2011 SAPL 127. 
57  Thibela v Minister van Wet en Orde 1995 3 SA 147 (SCA). In this case, issues on 
customary law were to be determined by the court. The widow claimed that the 
deceased who was her husband had adopted her son under customary law during 
his lifetime.  
58  Kerr 1996 SALJ 409. 
59  Bennett "Conflict of Laws" 17. 
60  Also mentioned in Himonga et al African Customary Law 55. 
61  Himonga et al African Customary Law 55. 
62  Himonga et al African Customary Law 58–60. 
63  See Bennett 2009 Am J Comp L 7, 8. 
64  Due to the uncertainties in this the SALC recommended that parties should be given 
the right to make this choice and, in the absence of any choice, it should be left to 
the discretion of the court (SALC Project 90 xvi). 
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the content of the applicable customary law where available. Based on the 
principles of judicial notice and judicial precedent, judges cannot exercise 
discretion to refrain from taking judicial notice where the circumstances 
require that they do. 
The Law of Evidence Amendment Act is however silent on whether a rule 
of customary law may only be judicially noticed when it has been 
ascertained by superior courts. A glimpse into the incidence prior to the 
enactment of the relevant provision of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 
sheds more light here. According to Bennett, there was a persistent 
dilemma with respect to the discretion of the magistrate's court to apply 
customary law and in what circumstances they could do so under section 
54A(1) of the Magistrate's Courts Act65 which was not definite and had a 
lacuna.66 This provision was consequently repealed in 1988 and replaced 
by section 1(1) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act seemingly as a 
solution to the uncertainty.67 Seen from this light, it can be deduced that 
judicial notice is not restricted to the decisions of superior courts. 
The use of the phrase "Any court may" in section 1(1) of the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act may be interpreted to mean that the provision of the Act is 
applicable to the traditional courts. However, another inference that can also 
be made from the circumstances surrounding its enactment is that the 
provision may have been made without ever intending that it should apply 
to traditional courts (ie the provision empowering courts to take judicial 
notice) since it merely sought to address a dilemma faced by the 
magistrate's courts.68 
Another legislation that regulates judicial notice is the Civil Proceedings 
Evidence Act69 which can also be said to apply to all laws of which 
customary law is one since it does not specifically exclude it. Section 5(1) 
of the Act provides that: 
Judicial notice shall be taken of any law or government notice or of any other 
matter which has been published in the Gazette.70 
                                            
65  Magistrate's Courts Act 32 of 1944. The Magistrates Courts – Rules of Court 
Amendment Rules, 2004 (GN R880 in GG 26601 of 23 July of 2004) regulates its 
proceedings. 
66  Bennett Sourcebook of African Customary Law 18, 119. 
67  Bennett Sourcebook of African Customary Law 18, 119. 
68  It may be necessary that this provision is amended to state clearly the exclusion of 
the courts of chiefs and headmen from its application. See the Chiefs' and 
Headmen's Courts Rules, 1967 (GN R2028 in GG 1929 of 29 December 1967) that 
provides for the application of customary rules in its adjudication. 
69  Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965. 
70  Section 5(2) of the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act 25 of 1965 provides that "A copy 
of the Gazette, or a copy of such law, notice or other matter purporting to be printed 
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It appears from the use of the disjunctive word "or" that it gives the court a 
choice between official and living customary law where they differ without 
giving priority to the official. However, it may be argued that the 
constitutional subjection of customary law to legislation states otherwise. 
Citing the cases of Ex Parte Minister of Native Affairs in re Yako v Beyi71 
and Morake v Dubedube,72 which were decided prior to the enactment of 
the current amendment to the Law of Evidence Amendment Act, O'Dowd 
explained that traditional courts can take judicial notice of native law and 
custom.73 However, should superior courts take judicial notice of customary 
laws that have been recognised by the traditional courts? Would the 
superior courts be justified in taking judicial notice of decisions of the 
traditional courts on the ground that the latter are regarded as more versed 
in customary norms, even though they are subordinate to the superior 
courts? Further, should traditional courts be bound to take judicial notice of 
legislated customary laws?  
Neither section 1 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act nor section 5(1) 
of the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act (the latter applying to superior courts 
only) differentiate between a superior and inferior court on the matter of 
which court may take judicial notice of a decision of another on a question 
of customary law. This would suggest that other courts may take judicial 
notice of customary law ascertained by traditional courts. This may indeed 
be beneficial to the development of customary law. Other courts would have 
the benefit of taking judicial notice of customary norms that are more likely 
to have undergone a more accurate process of ascertainment by persons 
who are custodians of the norms or to whom customary law is a lived reality. 
This, however, is subject to the limitations of how the flexibility of customary 
law is applied contextually. And since what the Constitution recognises is 
living customary law,74 to require traditional courts to apply legislated 
customary law would stymie the evolving nature of the law and affect the 
legitimacy of the court. 
The Law of Evidence Amendment Act provides that judicial notice of 
customary law can be taken "in so far as such law can be ascertained readily 
                                            
under the superintendence or authority of the Government printer, shall, on its mere 
production, be evidence of the contents of such law, notice or other matter, as the 
case may be." 
71  Ex parte Minister of Native Affairs: In re Yako v Beyi 1948 1 SA 388 (A). In this case, 
with respect to the commissioner's court is "bound by earlier judgments of the Native 
Appeal Court", Schreiner states that "[T]he rule of stare decisis should in general be 
observed". See Olivier 1989 SAPL 176. 
72  Morake v Dubedube 1928 TPD 625. 
73  O'Dowd Law of Evidence 104. See also May South African Cases and Statutes on 
Evidence 117 which also has several cases on this point. 
74  Mabena v Letsoalo 1998 2 SA 1068 (T). 
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and with sufficient certainty". Though "customary law" as used here should 
refer to living customary law, official versions appear to be included as well, 
having regard to section 5(1) of the Civil Proceedings Evidence Act. A 
number of points ensue from this. First, legislated customary law would be 
judicially noticed because it can be readily made available such as the 
Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters 
Act.75 The challenge here is that the content of such customary law, where 
it has been reduced to written form (be they texts, judicial precedent, 
legislation and other documentary sources like reports of commission, 
anthropological recordings etc) may differ from the actual normative practice 
of the community. The differences may occur because the recordings were 
made in error or the customary law, though correctly captured at the time it 
was recorded, may have evolved over time or does not agree with the norms 
sought to be ascertained of a particular community. 
Secondly, having regard to section 1(1) of the Law of Evidence Amendment 
Act, courts may rely on other evidence besides judicial pronouncements for 
the purpose of taking judicial notice of a customary law, as long as that 
evidence "readily" establishes the customary law and "with sufficient 
certainty". This may not necessarily be documentary proof but may include 
oral evidence76 which gives the courts the potential of ascertaining and 
applying living customary law despite the tendency to rely on written 
materials. Zeffertt et al explained that indigenous law is "capable of being 
readily ascertained with sufficient certainty" only if the "courts have access 
to authoritative sources".77 He referred to a few cases which included 
Harnischfeger Corporation v Appletory78 where the Supreme Court held that 
materials on a particular foreign law were "neither readily accessible nor 
ascertainable with such certainty" because the court's library as well as the 
library of a nearby university were deficient on them. Even though his 
reference is with respect to foreign law, the same provision applies to 
customary law. In Hlophe v Mahlalela79 the court could not ascertain the 
Swazi law and custom pertaining to custody of minor children after the death 
of the mother whose lobola was yet to be fully paid even after checking five 
books. 
The courts may augment scarce authorities with facts presented in 
evidence. In Mabena v Letsoalo,80 also decided in the same year, the court 
lamented a dearth of authorities on the customary rule put before it that the 
                                            
75  Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 
of 2009. 
76  Himonga et al African Customary Law 56. 
77  Zeffert et al South African Law of Evidence 312. 
78  Harnischfeger Corporation v Appletory 1993 4 SA 479 (W). 
79  Hlophe v Mahlalela 1998 1 SA 449 (T). 
80  Mabena v Letsoalo 1998 2 SA 1068 (T). 
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plaintiff and the mother of the bride can negotiate lobola. It, however, relied 
on facts put before it under section 1(2) of the Law of Evidence Amendment 
Act which confirmed the few documents presented to it. 
Relying on judicial notice dispenses with the need to lead evidence to prove 
customary law.81 This is because the courts would regard the customary 
law as an established fact.82 However, relying on such recorded law 
forecloses the ascertainment and application of living customary law by 
courts. This paper argues that an approach that is more amenable to living 
customary law would be for courts to utilise credible evidence of a 
customary law to buttress what the court has judicially noticed, or to 
disprove the credibility of what may have been judicially noticed. 
According to Zeffertt et al, the practice of judicial notice in South Africa lacks 
a clear-cut distinction between:  
[A] judicially noticed fact (which at common law has the effect of being 
conclusively proved) and a fact that has been rebuttably presumed (that is 
which has been sufficiently proved).83 
The situation is similar in Nigeria. 
A good example is the case of "sufficient certainty" which gives opportunity 
for living customary law to be ascertained and applied by the court as was 
done in Mayelane v Ngwenyama84 where the Constitutional Court could 
have adopted the evidence given at the court of first instance on the content 
of customary law requiring the consent of the first wife. No doubt the 
evidence before the court would be sufficient to get a verdict in favour of the 
applicant. However, the Constitutional Court's position that such "mere 
assertions", the person relying on it and her witness were not sufficient to 
establish a customary rule especially since the outcome would invariably 
apply to members of the broader community,85 supports the view that 
judicial notice based on such assertions is not conclusive proof of a position 
and must be applied cautiously by the courts. 
This paper argues that different evidentiary value should attach to each. 
Where parties to a suit do not dispute the contents of the applicable 
customary law even though they must still lead credible evidence to show 
that it does not represent the norms of the community, there should be a 
rebuttable presumption that that customary law is definitive on the matter. 
This is because no evidence was led to conclusively prove the norm. Parties 
                                            
81  O'Dowd Law of Evidence 103. 
82  Zeffert et al South African Law of Evidence 715. 
83  Zeffert et al South African Law of Evidence 716. 
84  Mayelane v Ngwenyama 2013 4 SA 415 (CC). 
85  Mayelane v Ngwenyama 2013 4 SA 415 (CC) para 47. 
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in subsequent cases should be given the opportunity to rebut the norm by 
presenting contrary evidence. 
It should, however, be noted that where a customary norm has been 
conclusively proved, it is different from admitted facts which need not be 
proved under the applicable evidence law. In a situation where parties in a 
subsequent case are not in dispute with a customary norm that had been 
conclusively proved in an earlier judgment, the judgment in the subsequent 
case affirming the conclusively proved customary norm should not be 
treated as a situation of admitted facts. The implication for such admitted 
facts is that they are not binding on subsequent cases on similar subject 
matter involving other parties who dispute their veracity and therefore 
should not qualify as judicially noticed facts. 
The rule of stare decisis creates occasions where lower courts are 
compelled to apply wrongly ascertained customary law.86 The common law 
position on judicial notice is that if judicial notice is taken of a fact as an 
outcome of an inquiry, no issues will be raised again concerning the fact.87 
However, it is a difficult proposition to apply stare decisis to customary law. 
Where judicial notice is utilised to preclude the presentation of further 
evidence to disprove a customary law that has been judicially noticed, it may 
hinder the ascertainment and application of living customary law by the 
courts, especially given its flexible nature and contextual application. 
Judicial notice may have its advantages, offering a less cumbersome means 
of proof, but it need not be sacrosanct when it comes to customary law. A 
rigid application results in a less credible process for ascertaining living 
customary law by the courts. 
Therefore, where a party has reason to dispute the content of a customary 
law that has been judicially noticed, he or she should be given the chance 
to present evidence to the contrary. The provision of section 1(2) of the Law 
of Evidence Amendment Act already addresses this by stating that "the 
provisions of subsection (1) shall not preclude any party from adducing 
evidence of the substance of a legal rule contemplated in that subsection 
which is in issue at the proceedings concerned". The disjunctive word "or" 
used in section 1(a) of the Evidence Act notwithstanding, also covers this if 
the party who puts forth the evidence contends that judicial notice cannot 
be applied for reasons that it does not correspond with the customary norms 
of the particular community. 
This paper therefore recommends that what is sought to be judicially noticed 
should first be affirmed by the subject community. This ensures that a 
                                            
86  Kludze "Evolution of the Different Regimes of Customary Law" 99. 
87  Zeffert et al South African Law of Evidence 717. 
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customary norm derives validity from the community and not from state 
institutions. It ensures that living law is taken into consideration and that 
however it is developed, it will be practically relevant to the community. 
Hence a middle ground will be established between establishing the fact of 
legal plurality by providing a conducive legal environment for the survival of 
living customary law and amid the restrictions of positivism and legal 
centralism. 
In this regard, the provisions of the old Evidence Act of Nigeria offer a better 
way of proving customary law through judicial notice. It required a degree 
of proof that justifies the use of judicial notice and confines such use to laid 
down rules and principles. This to an extent is replicated in South Africa. 
5 Conclusion 
While the Law of Evidence Amendment Act in South Africa and the 
Evidence Act in Nigeria provide for the utilisation of judicial notice as a 
means of proving customary law, it must not be done at the expense of 
ascertaining and applying living customary law. The utilisation of judicial 
notice may impede this in certain circumstances. The current provision of 
the Nigerian Evidence Act is broad and gives room for wide discretion by 
the judge in ascertaining and applying customary law to cases. However, 
not providing standards and the circumstances under which the court may 
take judicial notice of customary law has an implication. It leaves a wide field 
which can be explored by the judge against ascertaining and applying living 
customary law. On the other hand, also considering the wording of the 
provisions, though the courts are bound to adopt judicially noticed facts, 
judges can exercise liberty to deviate from these facts where credible 
evidence is led to the contrary. This additional evidence may aid the 
ascertainment and application of living customary law. The law in South 
Africa is more concise but the provisions of section 5(1) of the Civil 
Proceedings Evidence Act and section 1(1) of the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act also create a challenge with respect to judicial notice of 
legislated customary law over living customary law. 
An approach that is more amenable to living customary law would be for 
courts to utilise credible evidence of a customary rule to confirm what the 
court has judicially noticed or to disprove the credibility of what may have 
been judicially noticed. Hence, there should be a clear distinction between 
judicially noticed facts that are sufficiently proved and those reputably 
presumed. While for the latter, credible evidence can be led by the parties 
on the applicable living customary law to rebut the presumption, such 
credible evidence should also not be foreclosed for the former where 
necessary. Hence, the intriguing interface between positivist rules of 
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evidence and procedure, and, the essence of legal pluralism will be 
enhanced to not restrict entirely the definition of customary law to positivist 
rules. While positivist rules and procedure regulate how customary law can 
be ascertained and applied by the courts, its application must, however, be 
limited to the point where it threatens the essence of customary law. 
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